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Abstract
In macroeconomics, life-cycle modelsare typically used to address exclusively life-
cycle issues. This paper shows that modeling the life-cycle may be important when
addressing public policy issues, in this case the welfare costs of inﬂation. In the rep-
resentative agent model, the optimal inﬂation rate is characterized by the Friedman
rule: deﬂate at the real interest rate. In the corresponding life-cycle model, the opti-
mal inﬂation rate is quite high: for the benchmark calibration, it is around 95% per
annum. Much of the paper is concerned with understanding this result. Brieﬂy, in the
life-cycle model there are distributional consequences of injecting money via lump-
sum transfers. The net effect is to transfer income from old, rich agents to young,
poor ones. These transfers twist the age-utility proﬁle in a way that agents ﬁnd desir-
able from a lifetime utility point of view. A second issue concerns how to assess the
costs of inﬂation in a life-cycle model. Metrics that are equivalent in the representative
agent model can give very different answers in a life-cycle model.
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Measuring the welfare costs of inﬂation in dynamic general equilibrium models is, at
this point, well-trod territory. By way of example, the early work of Cooley and Hansen
(1989) placed the costs of a 10% inﬂation at around 0.4% of income, measured relative to
the Friedman rule optimum. With but a few notable exceptions, discussed later in this
introduction, estimates of the costs of inﬂation have been made within the representative
agent framework. For many macroeconomic issues, the representative agent ﬁction is
a useful one. For example, R´ ıos-Rull (1996) showed that for understanding aggregate
business cycle phenomena, the life-cycle is largely irrelevant. The basic question asked
in this paper is, How do the costs of inﬂation change when agents differ by age? For
the benchmark model, a life-cycle version of Cooley and Hansen, the answer is, Quite a
bit. More speciﬁcally, the optimal inﬂation rate (the one maximizing steady state life time
utility) is quite high – on the order of 95%. Before giving some intuition for why high
inﬂation is optimal, it will help to know the model’s key features.
First, as in Cooley and Hansen (1989), money is held in order to satisfy a cash-in-
advance constraint on purchases of the consumption good. Second following Cooley
and Hansen, money injections occur via lump-sum transfers (so-called helicopter drops
of money). Third, individuals live exactly T periods; there is no random death as in
R´ ıos-Rull (1996). Fourth, individuals face a hump-shaped human capital proﬁle. This
feature is included so as to match up with evidence on real wages over the life-cycle.
Fifth, individuals start life with no capital (real assets), and must end their lives with non-
negative capital holdings. Since there is no bequest motive, individuals will, in fact, end
life with no capital. Between birth and death, individual are unconstrained with respect
to their capital holdings, and so may go into debt if they wish. Finally, individuals start
life with some real money balances. This feature is included so that there is not a ‘trivial’
reason for inﬂation to be welfare-improving: If individuals have no initial real balances,
then if there is no lump-sum transfer of money balances, the cash-in-advance constraint
1implies that individuals would be unable to purchase consumption in the ﬁrst period of
their lives. So that money is not simply created “out of thin air,” it is assumed that agents
end life with the same level of real balances with which they started.
Increases in inﬂation have two opposing effects. The ﬁrst is the usual distortion of the
labor-leisure choice owing to the fact that current income cannot be spent on consump-
tion goods in the same period in which the income is earned. This ﬁrst effect implies that
inﬂation is welfare-reducing. The second effect is the redistribution of income operating
through the lump-sum money injections. This latter effect improves lifetime utility by
ﬂattening the utility-age proﬁle. For the benchmark calibration, the second effect domi-
nates up to an annual inﬂation rate of 95%.
The principal ﬁndings are as follows. As already discussed, in the benchmark model
in which seigniorage is the only source of government revenue, annual inﬂation rates
around 95% maximize steady state lifetime utility. A number of other welfare metrics
are considered; for the most part, they conﬁrm the ﬁnding that high inﬂation is welfare-
maximizing; see Section 4 for details. Why this surprising result? Under the benchmark
calibration, the real interest rate is positive, and the Euler equation governing asset accu-
mulation thus implies that individual consumption proﬁles rise with age. Owing to the
cash-in-advance constraint, real money balances also increase with age. Since new money
enters the economy via lump-sum transfers that are independent of age, the young re-
ceive more in transfers than they pay out in inﬂation taxes. The reverse is true for the old.
In effect, inﬂation transfers resources from the old to the young – a sort of reverse social
security system. These transfers tend to ﬂatten the utility-age proﬁle in a way that agents
ﬁnd desirable, at least from a lifetime utility point of view. Individuals are unable to repli-
cate this ﬂattening of the utility-age proﬁle on their own because they face a positive real
interest rate on their borrowing while the government can, in a sense, ‘borrow’ on behalf
of the individual at a zero real interest rate (the government simply transfers resources at
a point in time, albeit through distortionary inﬂation ﬁnancing).
2Since the inﬂation tax operates much like a consumption tax, a sanity check on the
benchmark model’s results is to analyze a real version of the model, dropping the cash-in-
advance constraint, and introducing a consumption tax. As in the benchmark model, tax
revenues are lump-sum rebated to households. The optimal consumption tax is around
14%, fairly close to the optimal inﬂation tax rate for the benchmark model: 15% (using
the quarterly inﬂation rate).
Whilethe speciﬁcinﬂationratethat maximizeslifetimeutility dependstosomedegree
on the particular parameter values, the result that high inﬂation rates maximize lifetime
utility is quite robust. A number of model variants are considered, motivated by a desire
tounderstandwhyhighinﬂationisoptimal. Theﬁrstsuchmodelvariantintroducestaxes
on labor and capital income, as well as on consumption purchases. These taxes are set at
levelsseenintheUnitedStates. Theproceedsoftheseﬁscaltaxesarelump-sumrebatedto
households. The reason for considering this variant is to ﬁgure out whether it really is the
abilityofthegovernmenttotransferincomefromtheoldtotheyoungthatdrivesthehigh
optimal inﬂation result in the benchmark calibration. The ﬁrst result of interest is that,
holding the other taxes ﬁxed, the lifetime utility-maximizing inﬂation rate is essentially
the Friedman rule (that is, the negative of the real rate of interest). Alternatively, suppose
thatastheinﬂationtaxisvaried, one oftheothertaxesisadjustedsothattotalgovernment
revenue is unchanged. Once more, fairly high inﬂation rates maximize lifetime utility.
Again, other welfare metrics give similar results. These results an reminiscent of those
found in Cooley and Hansen (1992); they found that capital and labor income taxes are
quite distorting compared to the inﬂation tax.
A second variant asks whether the cash-in-advance constraint is too rigid a payment
technology. To investigate this possibility, costly credit is introduced allowing for an en-
dogenous determination of “cash” and “credit” goods; see Prescott (1987); Schreft (1992);
Gillman (1993); Ireland (1994). Speciﬁcally, households consume a continuum of goods
and must choose which goods to purchase with cash, and which with credit. The cost
3of using credit increases with the “distance” from the household’s “home” market. As
in Dotsey and Ireland (1996), a household will use credit in those markets close to its
home, and cash in all other markets. When there are no other taxes, the optimal money
growth (inﬂation) rate is around 3% per annum. The only case in which high inﬂation
maximizes lifetime utility is when U.S. tax rates are in place and seigniorage revenue is
used to reduce the labor income tax; in this case, the optimizing inﬂation rate is in the
neighborhood of 40% per year.
A ﬁnal experiment considers the transition from one money growth rate to another.
In the costly credit version of the model with U.S. tax rates, reducing the money growth
rate to zero maximizes lifetime utility in steady state. However, a policy that generates a
welfare gain across steady states need not generate a welfare gain after accounting for the
transition between these steady states. An example would be an overlapping generations
model in which the policy under consideration shifts a lot of consumption from old age
to young age; the welfare losses of the initial old may dominate any subsequent welfare
gains. As shown in Section 7, all generations are made better off by switching to zero
money growth.
As mentioned earlier, there are two other notable papers that assess the importance
of heterogeneity in measuring the costs of inﬂation: ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (1992) and Erosa and
Ventura (2002). The environment considered by ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu is one in which individuals
hold money balances as a buffer against uninsurable income shocks (spells of unemploy-
ment). Her key result is that Bailey welfare triangles understate the costs of inﬂation by
as much as a factor of 3. Erosa and Ventura’s model has two types of agents, rich and
poor. They also allow for an endogenous cash-credit good distinction. They calibrate
their model to match observations for the United States which implies that the poor pur-
chase a greater proportion of their goods with cash, and so experience a greater burden
of the inﬂation tax.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Sec-
4tion 2, and calibrated in Section 3. Welfare results for the benchmark economy can be
found in Section 4. Section 5 introduces other taxes while Section 6 incorporates en-
dogenous cash-credit goods. Transition dynamics are presented in Section 7. Section 8
concludes.
2 The Economic Environment
The model setup is more general than is necessary for the benchmark (cash-in-advance)
model in order to accommodate later variants. To later allow for an endogenous cash-
credit good distinction, it is assumed that at each date t, a continuum of markets oper-
ate on the circumference of a circle; the length of the circumference is 2. Each location
along the circumference is occupied by a continuum of goods producing ﬁrms, ﬁnancial
intermediaries, and households of each cohort. Enough symmetry is assumed that the
analysis can focus on a representative ﬁrm, a representative ﬁnancial intermediary, and a
representative household of each cohort.
2.1 Households
At each date t is ‘born’ a unit mass of identical individuals. Each individual will experi-
ence exactly T periods of ‘economic life.’ The term economic life is used to refer to indi-
viduals who have entered the labor force and so participate in economic activity. Early
childhood development and education are not considered here. Altruism between par-
ents and their offspring is also suppressed. In order to analyze fairly realistic life-cycle
dynamics, the lifespan T will be long. In the calibration section, a period will be speciﬁed
as one quarter, and T will be set to 220, corresponding to 55 years of economic life.
Since individuals differ only as to their date of birth, individual-speciﬁc variables need
tospecifyanindividual’sdateofbirth, andtheircurrentperiodoflife. Bywayofexample,
ni
t denotes the hours of work of an individual born at date t who is in their ith period of
5life. In calendar time, these hours are supplied at date t + i.
In each period of life, an individual has a taste for variety with respect to consump-
tion goods. In particular, a household at location j0 cares about the range of goods,
[j0,mod(j0 + 1,2)]. In the presentation below, attention will be focused on the household
at location 0 which consumes goods on the interval j 2 [0,1], denoted fci
t(j)g1
j=0. These









Use of this aggregator is common in the costly credit literature; see, for example, Prescott
(1987). An implication of Eq. (1) is that the household will choose to consume the same
quantity of all goods.







t), b > 0.
The period utility function, U, is deﬁned over consumption, ci
t, and leisure, `i
t, and is
assumed to possess standard properties. Future utility is discounted at the rate b.


















t+i, i = 0,...,T   1.
(2)
The right-hand side gives sources of funds. The ﬁrst term is after-tax labor income; the tax
rate on labor income is tn. The variable hi, denoting the ‘human capital’ of an individual
aged i, is included in the model so that the life-cycle proﬁle of labor earnings resembles
that observed in the U.S. data. The human capital proﬁle is exogenous and known to an
individual from birth. At age i, an individual combines human capital with time supplied
to the market, ni
t, earning a pre-tax wage Wt+i on human capital-augmented hours. The
observed pre-tax wage for an individual aged i will be Wt+ihi.
6The second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (2) is after-tax capital income. The
household starts period t + i with real assets (or capital) ki
t. It rents this capital for a
nominal rental payment of Rt+i which is taxed at the rate tk.
The household also starts period t+i with money balances, Mi
t. It receives two lump-
sum transfers from the government: a purely monetary transfer, XM
t+i, and a ‘real’ transfer
which when expressed in nominal terms is XR
t+i.
The left-hand side of Eq. (2) represents uses of funds. The price level at t + i is Pt+i.
The household purchases the range of consumption goods fci
t(j)g1
j=0; these purchases are
taxed at the rate tc. The household also expends funds on investing in capital, given by
the second term on the left-hand side. Here, d is the depreciation rate of capital. Negative
investment is permitted and corresponds to a change in ownership in capital goods.
The household can use either cash or credit to purchase its consumption goods. If
the household uses credit in market j, it incurs a lump-sum cost of Qt+i(j). The indicator
function Ii
t(j) equals 1 if the household chooses to purchase good j with credit, and equals
0 if it buys good j with cash. Consequently, the integral on the left-hand side of Eq. (2)
represents to total outlay on credit services.
Finally, the household departs period t + i with nominal money balances Mi+1
t .








t+i, i = 0,...,T   1. (3)
Recalling that Ii
t(j) = 0 for goods purchased with cash, the term on the left-hand side of
the cash-in-advance constraint is the value of consumption purchased with money. These
purchases are constrained by the sum of beginning-of-period money balances and the
monetary lump-sum payment from the government, XM
t+i.




t  1, i = 0,...,T   1.
7The only constraints that will be placed on capital holdings are that individuals start
life with no capital, and they must end life with non-negative capital:
k0
t = 0, kT
t  0. (4)
ki+1
t < 0 would mean that at age i a member of generation t went into debt.
The ﬁnal two constrains are on money holdings. It is assumed that individuals start









If m = 0, then the cash-in-advance constraint, Eq. (3), would imply that positive ﬁrst
period of life consumption is feasible only if the transfer, XM
t , is strictly positive. This
transfer can be strictly positive only if money growth, and so inﬂation, is strictly positive.
Absent positive initial money balances there would be a trivial reason for positive inﬂa-
tion to dominate the Friedman rule (deﬂate at the real interest rate) since this would be
the only way for individuals to enjoy positive ﬁrst period consumption.
The initial real balances could be thought of as a transfer made from a parent to an
offspring, or as coming from earnings of a child prior to entering the labor force. The
constraint on end-of-life real balances is imposed to conserve on aggregate private money
balances (money balances are not being magically introduced through the endowment of
the just-born).
Most of the constraints faced by an individual will be satisﬁed owing to nonsatiation.
The cash-in-advance constraint will bind if inﬂation is sufﬁciently high to ensure that the
return on capital exceeds that on money (so that no one would hold money as a store of
value). It is assumed that this condition is, in fact, satisﬁed.
82.2 Financial Intermediaries
For the household to use credit in market j, it must purchase the right to use credit in that
market at the price Qt(j). This cost might be thought of as that associated with verifying
the identity of the household in market j. An intermediary located in market j requires
g(j) units of labor to identify the household. This labor input increases with distance:
g0(j) > 0. The nominal cost to the intermediary is Wtg(j). Owing to competition among
the ﬁnancial intermediaries in market j, in a competitive equilibrium each earns zero
proﬁts; thus,
Qt(j) = Wtg(j). (6)
2.3 Goods Producing Firms
Firms face a sequence of static problems. Each period, the typical ﬁrm rents capital, Kt,
and hires effective units of labor (that is, human capital-augmented labor), N
g




t ;zt)   RtKt  WtN
g
t , (7)
where F is a standard constant-returns-to-scale production function and zt is a shock to
technology. Since F is constant-returns-to-scale, in equilibrium ﬁrms will earn zero prof-
its. Consequently, there was no need to tackle the tricky issue of ﬁrm ownership when
specifying the households’ problems.
2.4 Government
Eachperiod, thegovernmentleviesasetoftaxesandcreates(ordestroys)moneybalances






9where mt is the gross growth rate of money, Mt is aggregate money balances, and T is
the number of generations alive at t. Consequently, each generation receives its ‘share’ of
new money balances.







where Ct denotes aggregate consumption, Ne
t is the total supply of labor (measured in
efﬁciency units), and Kt is the aggregate capital stock; these variables are deﬁned below
in Section 2.6. Notice that the government runs a balanced budget each period; it does
not issue debt.
2.5 Analysis: Cash or Credit?
In choosing whether to use cash or credit to purchase a particular good, a household
balances two different costs. In general, for the household to use cash, it must have ac-
quired this money in the previous period which entails an opportunity cost: the house-
hold could, instead, have acquired more of the real asset which presumably pays a higher
rate of return than money. While using credit does not require ‘advanced planning,’ it
does involve the direct cost Qt(j). Clearly, the household will choose to use cash when it
is relatively cheap to do so, else it will use credit.
Recall that the price of credit is given by Eq. (6), or in real terms,
qt(j) = wtg(j)
where qt(j)  Qt(j)/Pt and wt  Wt/Pt. A straight cash-in-advance version of the model
is a special case in which g(j) is so high that using credit is prohibitively expensive. More
generally, suppose that g(0) = 0 and limj!1 g(j) = ¥. That is to say, the labor input
required to identify the household in its ‘home market’ is zero while it requires an inﬁnite
input at the farthest market that the household shops in. Then both cash and credit will
10be used. Furthermore, since g0(j) > 0, it follows that there is a cutoff, si
t, such that credit
is used for goods j 2 [0,si
t] while cash is used for goods j 2 (si
t,1]; see Dotsey and Ireland
(1996). Consequently, the choice of fIi
t(j)g1
j=0 is simpliﬁed greatly. The simpler problem
is presented in the Appendix along with ﬁrst-order conditions and a conversion to real
magnitudes.
A feature of the ﬁxed cost nature of credit services is that rich agents are more willing
to incur the cost of using credit; see Erosa and Ventura (2002). In the current environment,
it is the older agents who are rich, and it is they who should use credit more frequently.
2.6 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is deﬁned in the usual way:
(1) Each member of cohort t chooses contingency plans for consumption, hours of work,
capital and money holdings, so as to maximize lifetime utility taking as given the
process generating prices and the evolution of the aggregate state.
(2) Firms maximize period-by-period proﬁts taking as given prices.



















































11In the market clearing conditions the summations are across individuals alive at date
t. By way of example, ci
t i is the consumption at date t of a typical member of cohort t i;
at time t, this individual is aged i.
3 Calibration
The length of a period is set to one quarter, and individuals live exactly 55 years; thus,
T = 220.






In the benchmark model, the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion, s, is set to unity and so
U(c,`) = lnc + wln`.
The goods production function is
F(K, Ng;z) = zKa(Ng)1 a.
The parameters governing production are taken from Gomme and Rupert (2007). The
capital share parameter, a, is set to 0.283 and corresponds to capital’s share of income
from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts. The technology shock, zt, follows
a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process,
lnzt = rlnzt 1 + et, et  N(0,s2
e).
Over the sample 1954–2001, Gomme and Rupert estimate r = 0.9641 and s2
e = 0.008164.
The depreciation rate for capital, d, is set to 0.01777, implying an annual depreciation rate
of 6.9%, a value that corresponds closely to the average depreciation rate implicit in the
capital stock and depreciation data reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.








Money growth also follows a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process,
mt = ymt 1 + (1  y)m + xt, xt  N(0,s2
x)
where m is the long run money growth rate. The parameters governing the behavior of
money growth are estimated from U.S. data on per capita currency and M1 growth. These
parameter estimates are summarized in Table 1. By either measure – currency or M1 –
average (quarterly) money growth has been fairly low. The stochastic processes for the
technology shock and money growth are assumed to be uncorrelated. Running SUR on
the Solow residual and per capital currency growth gives similar parameter estimates to
the above; the innovations have a correlation of 0.0936 which is not signiﬁcantly different
from zero.







The benchmark model is a straight cash-in-advance model without credit as in Cooley
and Hansen (1989). Setting g = ¥ ensure that no credit is used (except, perhaps, for the
home market which is of measure zero). The implications of more general formulations
with credit use are explored in Section 6.
The human capital proﬁles are smoothed proﬁles based on the Panel Study on Income
Dynamics and is taken from Gomme, Rogerson, Rupert and Wright (2005); see Figure 1b.
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(f) Utility by Age
Figure 1: Steady State
14factor, b, and the leisure weight, w. These parameters are set such that in steady state: (1)
the real interest rate is 4% per annum which is a typical value used in the real business
cycle literature; and, (2) households work, on average 0.255 of the time, a value consistent
with time-use surveys; see Gomme and Rupert (2007).
The benchmark calibration is designed to correspond as closely as possible to Cooley
and Hansen (1989). As a consequence, all the taxes are set to zero.
Finally, m, initial and ﬁnal money balances, are set to 0.1, which constrains ﬁrst period
consumption. As shown in Figure 1, this choice of initial money balanced clearly con-
straints ﬁrst period consumption in the benchmark model. However, this is not the case
in the costly credit version of the model analyzed in Section 6. To avoid too many changes
between the two model variants, initial money balances are kept the same. To ensure that
individuals in the costly credit model would want to spend all of their ﬁrst period money
balances, the initial endowment of real balances was kept “small.” The optimal inﬂation
results in the benchmark cash-in-advance model are fairly insensitive to agents’ initial
endowments of real money balances.
The values of the parameters for the benchmark calibration are summarized in Table 2.
3.1 Steady State
The age-proﬁles of consumption, human capital, real money balances, hours of work,
capital (real assets) and utility are graphed in Figure 1, along with the proﬁles corre-
sponding to a non-monetary version of the model (in which case all goods are effectively
credit goods). The non-monetary steady state is presented to verify that the introduction
of money into the life-cycle model does not severely alter the nature of the model’s steady
state.
The human capital proﬁles, taken from Gomme et al. (2005), indicate that real wages
rise fairly quickly, peak around age 55 (i = 140), then gradually decline. Hours of work
peak around age 35 (i = 60).
15Table 2: Benchmark Model Parameter Values
Preferences
b 0.9838 discount factor
w 2.3565 labor-leisure weight
s 1.0 coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion
Technology
a 0.283 capital’s share of income
d 0.0178 depreciation rate of capital
r 0.9641 technology shock, autoregressive parameter
se 0.0082 standard deviation of innovation to technology shock
fhigT 1
i=0 human capital proﬁles
Money Growth
y 0.8327 autoregressive parameter
m 1.0416 long run annual money growth rate
su 0.0045 standard deviation of innovation to money growth
Other
T 220 number of periods of life
Calibration Targets
h 0.255 average hours worked
r 0.0192 real interest rate (quarterly)
The consumption proﬁle rises monotonically with age. It is, perhaps, easiest to under-
stand the shape of this proﬁle in the non-monetary version of the model. In this case, one







t )[1+ rt+i+1   d]
o
.
Given logarithmic preferences, in steady state this equation reads
ci+1
ci = b[1+ r   d].
The term in square brackets is the gross real interest rate which is ﬁxed in the calibration
process (for the monetary steady state). In fact, the value of b is calibrated in order to
match that real interest rate target. It turns out that the product of the discount factor and
the gross real interest rate is larger than unity implying that individual will chose a path
for consumption that grows over their lifetimes.
16Real money balances also rise with age owing to the cash-in-advance constraint.
Early in the life-cycle, households run up debt: their capital holdings are negative.
Between ages 25 years (i = 20) and 55 years (i = 160), they save, followed by a prolonged
period of dissaving. Since there is no bequest motive, individuals choose to end their
lived with no real assets.
The age-proﬁle of utility initially falls, then rises throughout the remainder of life.
The fact that the monetary and non-monetary steady states are so close to each other
suggests that money is not distorting individual behavior too much. This observation
is not too surprising in light of the modest money growth (and consequently inﬂation)
rates. Given that in the benchmark model money growth is calibrated to the growth rate
of U.S. currency per capita, net money growth is 5% per annum.
3.2 Business Cycle Moments
Another litmus test for the model is whether its predictions for business cycle moments
are similar to those reported in the literature. Table 3 reports business cycle moments for
the U.S. economy, the benchmark model, and the non-monetary model.
There are two important points. First, the model’s performance (whether benchmark
or non-monetary) is on par with that of standard real business cycle models (with a repre-
sentative, inﬁnitely lived agent). This ﬁnding should not be too surprising since R´ ıos-Rull
(1996) found that an annual version of the life-cycle model generated business cycle mo-
ments similar to that of the standard real business cycle model.
Second, adding money and money growth ﬂuctuations has a fairly minor impact on
the model’s predictions for business cycle ﬂuctuations. Cooley and Hansen (1989) made
a similar observation for a representative, inﬁnitely lived agent model.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































184 Welfare Costs of Inﬂation
4.1 Lifetime Utility in Steady State
One obvious criterion for evaluating money growth (or inﬂation) rates is steady state
lifetime utility. Since steady state decisions differ across money growth rates, index these







Figure 2 plots V(m) against a range of money growth rates. Remarkably, steady state
lifetime utility is maximized at a money growth (inﬂation) rate of 95% per annum.1 By
way of contrast, in models with an inﬁnitely-lived representative agent, like Cooley and
Hansen(1989), steadystateutilityismaximizedbysetting m = b whichimpliesanegative
(net) money growth rate. Such a money growth rate results in a zero nominal interest rate,
a result known as the ‘Friedman rule.’
As seen in the literature, higher inﬂation (money growth) is associated with dimin-
ished aggregate market activity; see Figures 2a and 2b. For example, Cooley and Hansen
(1989) ﬁnd that an increase in the annual inﬂation rate from 0% to 100% lowers aggregate
output, consumption and hours by 16%; for the benchmark model, real activity falls by
11%.
That the utility-maximizing money growth rate is so high is even more surprising
given the similarity in the life-cycle proﬁles of consumption and leisure (hours of work)
across the benchmark and non-monetary models’ steady states presented in Figure 1.
That is to say, money growth is not introducing a substantial distortion into the steady
state of the model.
1A natural question is whether the extremely high inﬂation rate is the result of a programming error.
While computing the steady state is a computationally demanding task, verifying it is not. In particular,
the steady state quantities can be dumped into a ﬁle, imported into a spreadsheet, and the Euler equations
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Figure 2: Steady State Values Plotted Against Money Growth
20Some insight into why the lifetime utility-maximizing inﬂation rate is so high can
be garnered from Figure 3 which presents life-cycle proﬁles for the benchmark money
growth rate (5%) and the optimal money growth rate (95%). Notice that the higher money
growth (inﬂation) rate twists the utility proﬁle, making it ﬂatter.
Why should higher inﬂation lead to improved utility-smoothing over the life-cycle?
Recall that consumption (and, via the cash-in-advance constraint, real money balances)
grows over the life-cycle. Consequently, older agents pay a higher inﬂation tax than
younger agents – but the proceeds of the inﬂation tax are rebated independent of age.
Figure 3d shows that for the optimal inﬂation rate, net taxes paid – that is, the inﬂation
tax paid less the lump-sum transfer – are big and positive for old households while young
households receive transfers on net. In other words, inﬂation is a means of transferring
resources from old, rich households to young, poor ones.
Of course, there is a cost to inﬂation. As is standard in cash-in-advance models, inﬂa-
tion introduces a distortion into the labor supply decision since cash earned in the current
period cannot be spent until the subsequent period when inﬂation has eroded its purchas-
ing power. Figure 3a shows that, apart from the ﬁrst period of life, the entire age proﬁle
of consumption falls with inﬂation while Figure 3b shows that hours of work similarly
falls at all ages. That utility rises early in the life-cycle means that the increase in leisure
(decline in labor) more than offsets the decline in consumption. Presumably, tax-transfer
schemes that avoid this deleterious effect of inﬂation would deliver even higher lifetime
utility.
It is tempting to think that the results for the benchmark calibration are driven pri-
marily (or even entirely) by that ﬁrst period of life during which consumption is quite
low owing to the small endowment of real money balances. One way to address this is-
sue is to compute lifetime utility, excluding that ﬁrst period of life. Doing so lowers the
money growth rate that maximized lifetime utility to around 60% – still quite high.































































































































































































































































































































































































(c) Utility by Age
Figure 4: Optimal Consumption Tax
23effects of a consumption tax since this tax operates much like the inﬂation tax. To keep
the environment relatively simply, drop model from the money (allow credit to be costless
so that all goods are purchased on credit). The tax rates on labor and capital income, tn
and tk, remain at zero. Now, vary the consumption tax, tc, to determine the rate that
maximizes steady state lifetime utility. Figure 4a shows that the optimal consumption tax
isaround14%. Thisﬁgureshouldbecomparedwithaninﬂationtaxrateofapproximately
15% (the quarterly inﬂation rate is used in this calculation, not the annual one). The two
tax rates are, then, fairly close in magnitude.
Next, Figure 4b plots the life-cycle pattern of net transfers under both the optimal con-
sumption tax and the optimal inﬂation rate. Except for the ﬁrst period of life, these two
patterns are visually quite similar. Finally, Figure 4c shows utility by age for the optimal
consumption tax and optimal money growth rate. Again, ignoring the ﬁrst period of life,
the two series appear to the eye to be quite close together. Overall, the results of this con-
sumption tax experiment lends support for the notion that in the benchmark economy,
the optimal (lifetime utility-maximizing) money growth rate is quite high. This experi-
ment is also consistent with the intuition that a high money growth rate (or consumption
tax) maximizes lifetime utility because it transfers resources from the old to the young,
ﬂattening the life-cycle proﬁle of utility in a manner that agents ﬁnd desirable.
One might think that households should be able to achieve, on their own, any utility-
smoothing that they desire since they are free to go into debt. No doubt, introducing
period-by-period non-negativity constraints on capital holdings would worsen the ability
of individuals to smooth their utility over their lifetimes, thus perhaps increasing the
potential beneﬁts of inﬂation in this environment. However, when individuals go into
debt, they eventually must repay this debt. The government, on the other hand, can in
effect ‘borrow’ on behalf of the young at essentially a zero real interest rate. That is to say,
the government faces a different feasibility constraint than that implied by the sequence
of budget constraints confronting households.
244.2 Welfare Metrics
The next task is to obtain a ‘unit free’ measure of how agents care about alternative inﬂa-
tion (money growth) rates. A common approach in the literature is to ﬁnd an ‘equivalent
variation payment’ – that is, how much consumption must be given to agents to make
them indifferent between two alternative money growth rates. When there is a represen-
tative agent, this calculation is relatively straightforward; see, for example, Cooley and
Hansen (1989). This calculation is more complicated in the current environment owing to
heterogeneity over the life-cycle. Consequently, a number of alternative measures of the
welfare costs of inﬂation are explored.
Welfare costs will be expressed relative to a zero inﬂation rate. Let V(m0) denote the
lifetime utility associated with a zero money growth rate. For the ﬁrst two welfare met-
rics, ﬁnd the age-independent addition to consumption, Dc(m), that makes households
indifferent (in a lifetime utility sense) between m0 and some alternative money growth




biU[ci(m) + Dc(m),`i(m)] = V(m0).
To render this measure of the welfare cost unit-free, express the total transfer relative to









Clearly, these two metrics are closely related. The reason for presenting both is that there
is no clear concensus as to whether to present welfare costs in terms of percentage of
consumption, or percentages of income.
A closely related way to measure the costs of inﬂation is to ﬁnd the (again, age-
independent) fraction of consumption, lc(m), that must be given to agents to make them




biU[(1+ lc(m))ci(m),`i(m)] = V(m0),
W3 = lc(m)  100%.
Alternatively, the welfare cost can be expressed as the constant fraction of income needed




biU[ci(m) + ly(m)yi(m),`i(m)] = V(m0),
W4 = ly(m)  100%
where
yi(m) = (1  tn)w(m)hini(m) + [1  d + (1  tk)r(m)]ki(m) + xM(m) + xR(m).
The remaining measures of the costs of inﬂation make the equivalent variation pay-
ments age-speciﬁc. Relative to the metrics already presented, these welfare metrics can
target equivalent variation payments to those agents most affected by inﬂation. In this
case, for each age i, ﬁnd Dci(m) such that
U[ci(m) + Dci(m),`i(m)] = U[ci(m0),`i(m0)]. (11)
One pair of welfare metrics is obtained by simply adding up all of the individual equiva-














Suppose that some money growth rate generates a welfare beneﬁt. Thus far, all of
the welfare measures presented have the property that, at a point in time, a benevolent
26government could, in principle, implement a set of lump-sum taxes and transfers (cor-
responding to the equivalent variation payments) that would lead to a Pareto superior
allocation. Two ﬁnal welfare metrics dispense with this implementability consideration,













Measure W8 is essentially the same as that of Summers (1981) who used the percentage
change in lifetime income to measure the welfare costs of income taxation.
Table 4 and Figure 5 summarize the welfare calculations. The welfare-maximizing
money growth rate associated with welfare metrics W1 and W2 conform quite closely
with the money growth rate that maximizes lifetime utility. The largest welfare beneﬁt
(i.e., negative welfare cost) occurs around 95% annual money growth rates. The welfare
beneﬁts are quite sizeable: 1.1% of income according to W2. Welfare metrics W3 and
W4 yield maximum welfare beneﬁts at annual money growth rates between 85% and
95% and are associated with a welfare beneﬁt of 1.2% of income. By way of contrast,
the maximum welfare beneﬁt associated with welfare metric W6 is quite small (less than
0.1% of income) and occurs at  3% annual money growth. This result seems odd in
the sense that W6 computes age-speciﬁc lump-sum payments (implying that the equiva-
lent variation payments can be targeted to where they are “needed”) while W2 computes
an age-independent lump-sum payment. Finally, W8 – which discounts the age-speciﬁc
lump-sum payments computed for W6 – is maximized at 30% money growth, and yields
a welfare beneﬁt of less than 0.1% of income.
Itseemsoddthatalternative, reasonablewelfaremetricsgivesuchdifferentanswersto
such a fundamental question as: What are the welfare costs of alternative money growth
(inﬂation) rates? While lifetime utility is arguably the most reasonable measure of wel-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































295 Introducing Other Taxes
The analysis in Section 4.1 suggests that the utility smoothing afforded by the combina-
tionofahighinﬂationtaxandlargelump-sumtransfersisattheheartofthehighlife-time
utility-maximizing money growth rates. If that is the case, then arming the government
with alternative sources of revenue – consumption, labor income and capital income taxes
– should lessen its reliance on the inﬂation tax, and so reduce the optimal money growth
rate. This is the exercise considered in this section.
The tax rates are taken from Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994), and correspond to
average effective tax rates for the U.S. The speciﬁc values used are: tc = 5.8%, tn = 24.8%
and tk = 42.9%, corresponding to the consumption tax, labor income tax and capital
income tax, respectively.
Life-time utility is plotted against money growth in Figure 6a while the welfare met-
rics W2, W4, W6 and W8 are plotted in Figure 6b. Now, very moderate deﬂation maxi-
mizes life-time utility; all of the welfare metrics lead to the same conclusion. These results
conﬁrm the conjecture that it is the lump-sum transfers that are driving the high optimal
money growth rates found in Section 4.
As shown in Table 5, the welfare beneﬁt of  3% inﬂation is between 0.1% and 0.2% of
income, depending on the welfare metric. The costs of moderate inﬂations are similar to
those found by Cooley and Hansen (1989). For example, relative to a zero inﬂation rate, a
10% inﬂation rate generates a welfare cost between 0.3% and 0.5% of income, depending
on the welfare metric.2
5.1 Revenue Neutral Experiments
Now, suppose that the government uses seigniorage revenue to lower one of the other
taxes, subject to raising the same revenue as under zero inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, as money
2Cooley and Hansen (1989) report welfare costs relative to an optimal inﬂation rate (the Friedman rule)































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 6: Revenue Neutral Experiments, Cash-in-advance, U.S. Taxes
t
c =  0.4% t
n =  10.2 t
k =  6.9%
m 25% 210% 40%
 W2 0.1527 4.0525 5.6446
 W4 0.1507 4.1945 5.2848
 W6 0.0911 2.9631 7.7376
 W8 0.0689 2.3840 6.0060
Notes: m is the money growth (inﬂation) rate that maximizes life-time
utility. W2 through W8 are metrics of the welfare costs of inﬂation and
are deﬁned in Section 4.2. The initial U.S. tax rates are: tc = 5.8%,
tn = 24.8% and tk = 42.9%.
growth, m, is varied, adjust one of tc, tn and tk to satisfy
(m   1)M(m) + tcC(m) + tnW(m)Ne(m) + tkR(m)K(m) =
tc(0)C(0) + tn(0)W(0)Ne(0) + tk(0)R(0)K(0).
The results of these experiments are summarized in Table 6. Replacing the U.S. con-
sumption tax of 5.8% with a consumption subsidy of 0.45%, ﬁnanced by 25% annual
money growth, maximizes lifetime utility and is associated with either a modest wel-
fare gain (around 0.15% of income according to welfare metrics W2 and W4) or a welfare
loss (0.1% of output according to metrics W6 and W8). As with the benchmark cash-in-
advance model with no other taxes, the optimal policy depends on the welfare criterion
applied. In this case, welfare metrics W6 and W8 suggest that the optimal inﬂation rate is
slightly positive (1  2%), yielding a negligible welfare beneﬁt.
Next, lowering the tax rate on labor income from 24.8% to a subsidy rate of 10.2%
(associated with a 210% inﬂation rate) maximizes lifetime utility. This policy generates a
substantial welfare gain of 2.4% to 4.2% of income. Welfare metrics W2 and W4 are also
maximized at 210% money growth; metric W6 at 140%; and W8 at 160%.
Finally, life-time utility is maximized by replacing the capital income tax of 42.9% with
a subsidy of 6.9% and a money growth rate of 40% per annum. As with the labor income
33replacement experiment, the welfare gains of this policy are sizeable: between 5.3% and
7.7% of income. In this case, the welfare welfare metrics all indicate that the welfare
beneﬁt is maximized at an inﬂation rate near 40%.
To summarize the results from this section, holding the tax rates on consumption,
labor income and capital income at their U.S. values, the optimal inﬂation rate is approx-
imately the Friedman rule (deﬂate at the negative of the real interest rate). However, al-
lowing the proceeds of the inﬂation tax to replace one of these other taxes again generates
high optimal inﬂation rates – as high as 210% in the case in which seigniorage revenue is
used to replace the labor income tax rate.
6 Credit
Perhaps the high optimal inﬂation rates obtained above are due to the very rigid pay-
ments technology associated with the cash-in-advance constraint. When credit is not
available (as in the benchmark economy), the cash-in-advance constraint implies that the
burden of the inﬂation tax is borne by those who consume the most. In the benchmark
model, that burden falls on older agents; see Sections 3.1 and 4.2. In this section, the pa-
rameters of the credit technology are calibrated to U.S. observations, allowing agents to
choose which goods they wish to purchase with cash and which with credit. Borrowing
on an idea in Erosa and Ventura (2002) who use a similar credit technology, rich agents
(in the benchmark economy, older agents), are better able to afford to use the credit tech-
nology. Consequently, old, rich agents should make greater use of the credit technology,
reducing the role of the inﬂation tax in ﬁnancing transfer payments.
The parameters in the credit technology Eq. (10) are now calibrated as in Dotsey and
Ireland (1996). They use two pieces of information to pin down the two parameters, g
and q: Evidence on the use of money for transactions in the U.S. from Avery, Elliehausen,
Kennickell and Spindt (1987), and the long-run interest semi-elasticity of money demand.
34Suppose that ‘money’ in the model corresponds to currency in the U.S. economy. Then
30% of transactions in the U.S. use money, and the interest semi-elasticity is 2.73. The
ﬁrst observation requires that, in steady state, the average value of s must be 0.7 (70% of








Using the second observation requires solving the model for two different money
growth rates (implying two different inﬂation rates, and so nominal interest rates). As




where v10 denotes the annual velocity of money under a 10% inﬂation, R10 is the corre-
sponding nominal interest rate, and variables with 0 subscripts correspond to an inﬂation
rate of 0%. The nominal interest rate is computed from a Fisher equation,
R = (1+ p)(1+ r   d)
where r is the real rental price of capital, and so r   d is the real interest rate.
6.1 Inﬂation Tax Only
To start, consider the environment in which there are no other taxes: tc = 0, tn = 0 and
tk = 0. This version of the model corresponds to the benchmark (cash-in-advance) econ-
omy, except that individuals are now able to use credit for some of their purchases. Recall
that in the benchmark model, the optimal inﬂation rate was very high: 95% maximized
lifetime utility; see Table 4. Results for the costly credit version of the model are summa-
rized in Table 7. As with the benchmark model, the optimal inﬂation rate depends on the
welfare criterion used. Allowing for the use of credit, an inﬂation rate of 5% maximizes
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(b) Fraction of Goods Purchased with Credit, by Age
Figure 7: Costly Credit Model, Inﬂation Tax Only
and W6, the other welfare metrics are also maximized at low inﬂation rates (between 3%
and 5% per year). According W6 – which computes age-speciﬁc, undiscounted lump-sum
payments – a modest deﬂation of  3% is best.
Figure 7a illustrates that net transfers are greatly diminished when credit use is per-
mitted. For comparison with the benchmark model, net transfers are computed for a
money growth rate of 95% – the rate that maximizes lifetime utility in the straight cash-in-
advance model. Under the straight cash-in-advance, such a money growth rate allowed
the government to raise considerable revenue from old agents, and make large transfers
to the young. By way of comparison, in the costly credit version of the model, these taxes
and transfers are extremely modest. This result lends further credibility to the notion that
in the benchmark model of Section 4, it is the large taxes and transfers that leads to the












Notes: See Section 4.2 for an explanation of the calculation of the wel-
fare metrics W2 through W8. Welfare costs are computed relative to
a zero inﬂation rate.
very high optimal inﬂation rates.
6.2 Other Taxes Too
Introducing other taxes to the costly credit version of the model leads to uniformly lower
optimal inﬂation rates. In this case, it is difﬁcult to solve for steady state when money
growth is negative, and the optimal inﬂation rate (by any metric) is zero. Since welfare
costs (or beneﬁts) are measured relative to a zero inﬂation rate, the welfare costs of the
(constrained) optimal inﬂation rate are also zero.
Next, the revenue neutral experiments of Section 5.1 are repeated for the costly credit
version of the model. As above, as the money growth rate is varied, so too does the
amount of seigniorage revenue raised. This seigniorage revenue is used to reduce one
other tax. The results of these experiments are summarized in Table 8.3 When seigniorage
revenue is used to reduce the consumption tax, the optimal inﬂation rate is quite mod-
est: No more than 2% per annum. This policy reduces the consumption tax rate by 0.2
percentage points, and generates a very modest welfare gain (less than 0.01% of income).
However, when the proceeds of the inﬂation tax are used to lower the labor income tax
3Results for reducing the capital income tax are not included in Table 8 because the economy appears to
be on the “wrong” side of the Laffer curve. Consequently, as inﬂation rises, the capital income tax actually
has to rise as well to maintain a ﬁxed level of government revenue.








Replace consumption tax tc
Lifetime utility 2 5.6
W2 2 0.0085 5.6
W4 2 0.0083 5.6
W6 0 0.0000 5.8
W8 1 0.0013 5.7
Replace labor income tax tn
Lifetime utility 70 20.3
W2 70 0.4459 20.3
W4 70 0.4229 20.3
W6 60 0.3585 20.7
W8 60 0.3340 20.7
Notes: At zero inﬂation, taxes are set to their values for the U.S. econ-
omy: tc = 5.8%, tn = 24.8% and tk = 42.9%. Seigniorage revenue is
used to replace one other tax as explained in Section 5.1. See Section 4.2
for an explanation of the calculation of the welfare metrics W2 through
W8.
38rate, rather more substantial inﬂation rates, between 60% and 70%, maximize welfare.
The labor income tax rate falls by over 4 percentage points, and this policy results in a
welfare gain of between 0.3% and 0.4% of income, depending on the welfare metric used.
While these welfare gains are smaller than seen in the straight cash-in-advance model,
they are sizeable when compared to welfare gains typically seen in the literature.
7 Transition Dynamics
As brieﬂy discussed in the introduction, comparing welfare across steady states can be
misleading. Consequently, it is not obvious that the welfare gains identiﬁed above (com-
puted across steady states) would hold up if the transition path from one steady state to
another is considered.
Theparticularexampleanalyzedinthissectionisthecostlycreditversionofthemodel
with U.S. taxes. The policy switch is from ﬁve percent money growth (the U.S. historical
average for currency per capita) to zero percent. In steady state, the welfare beneﬁt of
this change in policy is around 0.1% of income (using welfare metric W6 which computes
age-speciﬁc lump-sum payments). The policy change is unanticipated and implemented
at time zero. The transition path is computed by using decision rules that have been
linearized around the zero money growth steady state, but with initial conditions given
by the ﬁve percent money growth steady state.
The welfare cost of this policy change is computed in a similar fashion as to how the
welfare metric W6 is computed. The difference is that along the transition path, the age-
speciﬁc lump-sum payments are computed for each date of the transition. If there is, in
fact, a welfare beneﬁt at each date, then it would be possible, in principle, to actually
implement the set of taxes and transfers that would lead to a Pareto superior allocation.
The transition paths for key macroeconomic variables are summarized in Figures 8a





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40pact, and stay above their previous steady state values. This result is common in models
of inﬂation: A permanent reduction in inﬂation lowers the inﬂation tax which, in a model
with a cash-in-advance constraint, operates like a tax on wage income. In the face of a
higher effective real wage rate, individuals are willing to work more. The transition to
the new steady state is rapid: Most of the action occurs within 10 quarters.
Figure 8b gives the welfare beneﬁt of following this disinﬂation policy. The welfare
beneﬁt rises sharply on impact, falls somewhat, then asymptotically approaches its long
run value – with a longer transition than for the macroaggregates. Notice, in particular,
that the welfare beneﬁt is uniformly positive.
Finally, Figure 8d plots the lifetime utility of those generations living through the tran-
sition. Unlike the other ﬁgures in Figure 8, the horizontal axis in Figure 8d gives the co-
hort, not time. For example, the observation at  200 is the lifetime utility of the cohort
born at date  200. It lives from t =  200 through t = 19. This cohort experiences 200
quarters of life under the ﬁve percent money growth regime, and 20 quarters of zero per-
cent money growth. Relative to lifetime utility in the ﬁve percent money growth steady
state, every generation living through the transition is made better off. It is, perhaps, in-
teresting to note that those who are very young when the policy is implemented have
higher lifetime utility than those born a few quarters after policy implementation. Those
who are young at date 0 have received the beneﬁt of the net transfer payments associated
with positive money growth, but then: (a) do not have to make the net payments when
they are old, and (b) do not have their labor supply decisions distorted as much by inﬂa-
tion. The intuition underlying the Friedman rule suggests that a negative inﬂation rate
would distort individual decisions even less than zero inﬂation. If monetary policy were
subject to a popular vote, the move to zero inﬂation would be accepted unanimously.
418 Conclusion
Cooley and Hansen (1989) analyzed the costs of inﬂation in a representative agent model.
The benchmarkmodel is essentially alife-cycle version oftheir model. Whereasthe Fried-
man rule is optimal in Cooley and Hansen, in the benchmark model the optimal inﬂation
rate is quite high – around 95% per annum. This rather remarkable result was traced to
the fact that lump-sum money injections imply a transfer of income from old, rich agents
to young, poor ones. The net result is a ﬂattening of the utility proﬁle (by age) that agents
ﬁnd desirable, at least from a lifetime utility point of view.
A number of model various were considered, initially motivated try a desire to under-
stand the high optimal inﬂation rate in the benchmark model. Adding other faxes to the
model provides the government with an alternative means to ﬁnance it lump-sum trans-
fers. In this case, the optimal inﬂation rate is essentially the Friedman rule. However, if
seigniorage revenue is used to replace other taxes, high intention rates are again optimal.
This last results an reminiscent of results in Cooley and Hansen (1992) who found that
the distorting of the inﬂation tax are small relative to income taxes.
A second model variant allowed for an endogenous cash-credit good distinction in
order to assess whether the benchmark economy’s results were due to the rigid payment
technology implicit in the cash-in-advance constraint. In large part it is. Absent other
taxes, the optimal limitation rate was 5% – much smaller than the benchmark economy,
but still well alone the Friedman rule. In this case agents, can avoid some of the effects
of inﬂation by purchasing costly credit services. As in Erosa and Ventura (2002), it is the
rich agents (here, older agents) who can afford to pay for credit, thereby limiting the gov-
ernment’s ability to apply the inﬂation tax. Like the benchmark economy, providing the
government with alternative sources of tax revenue further lowers the optimal inﬂation
rate. Like the benchmark economy, in the costly credit version of the model, the inﬂation
tax imposes a low distortion relative to, say, the labor income tax.
An interesting issue that arises in a life-cycle model is how to assess the welfare costs
42of inﬂation. Essentially, four metrics were considered: (1) an age-independent Hick-
sian equivalent payment; (2) an age-independent percentage increment to consumption;
(3) age-speciﬁc lump-sum payments, undiscounted; and (4) age-speciﬁc lump-sum pay-
ments discounted try the real interest rate. In a representative agent framework, like
Cooley and Hansen (1989), these metrics as well as an evaluation of lifetime utility all
deliver the same answer for the optimal inﬂation rate, namely the Friedman rule (de-
ﬂate the the real interest rate). In a life-cycle model, this equivalence fails of hold. Most
peculiarly, in the benchmark model, the metric based on ﬁnding age-speciﬁc lump-sum
transfers (undiscounted) indicates that the Friedman rule is optimal, in sharp contrast to
the 95% optimal inﬂation rate according to lifetime utility. This is an important difference
between life-cycle and representative agent models.
Comparing steady state utility may be a misleading measure of the desirability of
alternative policies. It is not obvious that along the transition path agents are made better
off by a change in policy, and there may be distributional effects to consider. To evaluate
thispossibility, thetransitionpathwascomputedforthecostlycreditversionofthemodel
with U.S. tax rates in place. The policy change is to lower money growth once-and-for-
all from 5% per annum to 0%. In steady state, this policy generates a welfare beneﬁt
of 0.12% of income. Two results stand out in this case. First, along the transition path,
the welfare beneﬁt measured at each date is strictly positive. Second, the lifetime utility
of all generations experiencing the change in policy is higher than it would have been
















































t . Recall that credit is used for consump-
tion purchases on markets j 2 [0,si
t] while cash is used for the remainder, j 2 (si
t,1]. Keep
in mind the boundary conditions, Eqs. (4) and (5). The relevant ﬁrst-order conditions are:
Uc(ci
t,1  ni
















t, i = 0,...,T   1
bEt+iLi+1
t [(1  d)Pt+i+1 + (1  tk)Rt+i+1] = Li








1t, i = 0,...,T   2
These equations, along with the budget constraint, Eq. (2), and cash-in-advance con-
straint, Eq. (3), and the boundary conditions characterize the solution to the household’s
problem, including the multipliers, Li
1t and Li
2t.
44A.1.2 Goods Producing Firms
The problem faced by a typical goods producer is given in the text in Eq. (7). The associ-
ated ﬁrst-order conditions are:
PtF1(Kt, N
g
t ;zt) = Rt
PtF2(Kt, N
g
t ;zt) = Wt
A.1.3 Financial Intermediaries










































45A.1.6 Conversion to Real Magnitudes





































Notice that money balances are normalized by the ‘previous period’ price level; this is
done so that the household’s budget constraint does not involve next period’s price level
which is not known at the time household decisions are made.
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Euler equations and budget constraint:
ci
t + ki+1
t = (1  tn)wt+ihini
t + [(1  tk)rt+i + 1  d]ki
t + xR








t, i = 0,...,T   1
li
t = bEt+ili+1
t [(1  tk)rt+i+1 + 1  d], i = 0,...,T   2
47k0
t = 0, kt
t = 0
A.3 Computational Issues
Notice that the aggregate state vector includes the capital and money holdings of all co-
horts alive at a particular date. Individual decision rules depend on the entire state vector
(not merely a few selected moments) since the state vector is needed to form expectations
offutureprices(which, inturn, dependonthefuturestatevector). Fortunately, aspointed
out by R´ ıos-Rull (1996), matters are greatly simpliﬁed if decision rules are linear. When
solving for decision rules when the stochastic elements of the model are in play, it is then
opportune to use a log linearization technique. See Klein (2000) for details on the partic-
ular technique employed in this paper.
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